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ARTICLES 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTIVISM: 
POSSIBILITIES AND PROSPECTS 
R. George Wright* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the fields of ethics, politics, and law, various forms of what is called 
“constructivism”1 have recently risen to prominence.2 Professor Sharon Street has, 
                                                          
 
* Lawrence A. Jegen III Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. 
1 The varieties of constructivism prevent us from offering a simple definition, or even a broad overview, 
of the concept until some further context has been provided. But we can say that constructivism often 
tries to retain the best features of fundamentally different approaches to whatever ethical, political, or 
constitutional problem is being addressed. Constructivism typically focuses on developing some sort of 
multi-step decision-making procedure that can result in a supposedly justified solution to, say, 
constitutional issues. Crucially, most forms of constructivism try to avoid relying on the now 
controversial idea that some moral, political, or constitutional principles are genuinely better than others, 
mostly independent of our preferring them. Constructivism thus sets aside what is called moral realism. 
But constructivism typically does not also set aside the less ambitious idea that some moral or 
constitutional principles can, within limits, in some sense be meaningfully justified. Constructivism thus 
seeks a middle ground between classical moral realism and sheer arbitrariness in moral judgments. 
Unfortunately, the term “constructivism,” in an even broader sense, is used in a wide variety of 
unrelated fields, with none of which we shall herein have anything to do. Mention should briefly be 
made, however, of broad constructivist views of reality itself, and of constructivist views of the nature 
of facts. See, e.g., JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 1 (1995) (referring to the 
constructed, yet in a sense objective, character of “things like money, property, government, and 
marriages”); id. at 191 (“a socially constructed reality presupposes a nonsocially constructed 
[underlying] reality”); PAUL BOGHOSSIAN, FEAR OF KNOWLEDGE: AGAINST RELATIVISM AND 
CONSTRUCTIVISM 22 (2006) (constructivism about facts as holding that “[t]he world . . . we seek to . . . 
know about is not what it is independently of us and our social context; rather all facts are socially 
constructed in a way that reflects our contingent needs and interests”). Whether even our most basic 
needs and interests are entirely constructed may be left unclear. 
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for example, written that “[c]onstructivist positions in ethics have inspired a great 
deal of both enthusiasm and skepticism in recent years. Most agree that when it 
comes to . . . normative ethics and political philosophy, constructivist views are a 
powerful family of positions.”3 For years the preeminent work of John Rawls on 
justice, ethics, politics, law, and even constitutional law in particular—loosely 
allied with that of other prominent scholars4—has been a leading form of 
constructivism. 
Beyond the evolving Rawlsian versions, constructivism comes in a number of 
varieties,5 and is applied in various contexts.6 But the potential for constructivism 
has thus far been explored far more prominently in ethics,7 and even in political 
justice,8 than in the more specific but vital context of constitutional law itself. This 
Article seeks to remedy this inattention to constitutional constructivism. 
Constitutional constructivism indeed seems very promising. In the end, though, the 
value of constructivism when applied to constitutional law turns out to be 
surprisingly limited.9 
Unfortunately, the most prominent forms of constructivism, as adapted to 
constitutional theory and adjudication, would realistically fail to live up to the 
hopes of their advocates. In the constitutional context, even the most promising 
forms of constructivism, including especially that of John Rawls, would in 
particular fail to sufficiently promote the stability and sustainability of a reasonably 
just constitution. This unfortunate outcome would arise even if no citizen took 
extremist, intolerant, or illiberal broad views of politics, morality, or religion. 
Constitutional constructivism would in practice require a major and permanent 
transfusion of basically unconstructed, real, uninvented, and objectively valid 
                                                                                                                                      
 
2 See the mere sampling of the literature referred to below, along with the more explicit assessment of 
Professor Sharon Street, What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?, 5 PHIL. COMPASS 363, 363 
(2010). 
3 Id. 
4 See infra Section III. 
5 See infra Section III. 
6 See infra Section III. 
7 See infra Section III. 
8 See infra Section III. 
9 See infra Sections IV–V. 
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ethics, including more specifically a more substantial reliance on morally real, 
unconstructed, basic virtues.10 
The crucial problem is that the most prominent forms of ethical and 
constitutional constructivism explicitly seek to set aside and minimize any reliance 
on any form of moral realism. We may take moral realism to be roughly the view 
that sound moral principles or virtues are “real,” or largely discovered, rather than 
merely somehow adopted or invented to “solve” practical problems. But in the end, 
various basic virtues, as largely discovered—and thus “real”—are indispensable for 
a stable just constitutional regime, as Rawls and others envision it. Constitutional 
constructivism’s setting aside of moral realism and downplaying of the role of 
morally real basic virtues in promoting the stability of a reasonably just regime thus 
crucially undermines constitutional constructivism. 
The ideas of constructivism, and of constitutional constructivism in particular, 
quickly display complexity.11 This Article offers some understanding of basic 
constructivist ideas below.12 But first, the Article lays the groundwork for the 
potential importance of constitutional constructivism by presenting a major 
problem in constitutional adjudication to which it would seem that constitutional 
constructivism could present an attractive solution.13 The clearest way to present 
the problem that constitutional construction might resolve involves a brief 
consideration of some famous language in the classic United States Supreme Court 
case of Calder v. Bull.14 
II. A MAJOR PROBLEM POSED BY THE CASE OF CALDER V. 
BULL 
The narrowly technical legal issues involved in Calder v. Bull, involving the 
Supreme Court’s application of the prohibition of ex post facto laws15 in a state 
court civil probate case,16 can for our purposes be safely set aside. We shall instead 
                                                          
 
10 See infra Section IV. 
11 See infra Section IV. 
12 See infra Section III. 
13 See infra Section II. 
14 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
15 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. For discussion of the ex post facto law issue, see, for example, 
HADLEY ARKES, CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS AND ANCHORING TRUTHS 28−33 (2010). 
16 See Calder, 3 U.S. at 386−87 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
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focus on the famous, much broader language of Justices Chase and Iredell 
respectively. Chase and Iredell, whatever their intent, raised a jurisprudential 
problem that nicely motivates an interest in constitutional constructivism, as we 
shall further define that approach below.17 
The conflicting language of Justices Chase and Iredell18 deserves quotation at 
some length. Consider first the language of Justice Chase: 
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a State Legislature, or that it is absolute 
and without control, although its authority should not be expressly restrained by 
the Constitution, or fundamental law, of the State. The people of the United 
States erected their Constitutions, or forms of government, to establish justice, to 
promote the general welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty; and to protect 
their persons and property from violence. The purposes for which men enter into 
society will determine the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they 
are the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the proper 
objects of it.19 
The conclusion of Justice Chase’s argument then takes the following memorable 
terms: “An ACT of Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first 
principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of 
legislative authority.”20 
By way of contrast, though, consider the language of Justice Iredell: 
If . . . the Legislature of the Union, or the legislature of any member of the 
Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of their constitutional power, 
the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, 
contrary to the principles of natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are 
                                                          
 
17 See infra Section IV. 
18 Their opinions appear seriatim. 
19 Calder, 3 U.S. at 387−88 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
20 Id. at 388 (capitalizations in the original). Justice Chase’s language does not suggest that the analysis 
of federal congressional legislation should be fundamentally different. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 66 (2012) (quoting the language of Justice Chase). 
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regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon 
the subject . . . .21 
The precise intent of both Chase and Iredell remain contested even today.22 
But it does seem that “most observers . . . assume that Chase believed that the 
judiciary could invalidate state law on the basis of principles of ‘reason’ not 
embodied in the text of the United States Constitution,”23 whether this “natural 
law”24 interpretation is ultimately sound or not.25 Correspondingly, “Justice 
Iredell’s opinion . . . is usually understood as a legal positivist argument against the 
idea that the Constitution incorporates principles of natural law or rights.”26 
                                                          
 
21 Calder, 3 U.S. at 399 (opinion of Iredell, J.). Actually, Iredell’s language places no special limits on 
judicial creativity. As long as a judge does not rely on natural law thinking, the Iredellian judge can 
reach any desired plausible result in any case, perhaps by broader or narrower readings of, say, Equal 
Protection, substantive Due Process, or the First Amendment. There is thus little realistic practical 
difference in judicial constraining power between Chase’s language and that of Iredell. 
22 For a brief survey of several possibilities, see Mike Rappaport, Lash, Tushnet, Chapman, and 
McConnell on Justice Chase’s Opinion, in Calder v. Bull, LIBRARY OF LAW AND LIBERTY (June 5, 
2012), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2012/06/05/lash-tushnet (recognizing three possible interpretations 
of Justice Chase’s opinion while briefly recounting the contemporary debate). 
23 Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 116 YALE L.J. 
1672, 1745 (2012). 
24 Id. 
25 See id. at 1746 (presenting a dissenting view). 
26 James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Natural Law and Natural Rights in Constitutional Interpretation, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2285, 2286 (2001). For further interpretation of Chase’s and Iredell’s opinions in 
Calder, see, for example, AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 521 n.15 (2012) (“Chase declared that American 
governments must honor not only the ‘express’ limitations on their own power found in the state and 
federal constitutions, but also ‘great first principles of the social compact.’”); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–1888, at 46 (1992) 
(referring to “the famous controversy between Chase and Iredell over the role of natural law in 
constitutional adjudication”); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 211 n.41 (1981) (“Calder, far from being authority for the view that natural law is enforceable 
in the name of the Constitution, appears on close reading as strong authority against it.”); Edward B. 
Foley, The Bicentennial of Calder v. Bull: In Defense of a Democratic Middle Ground, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1599, 1599 (1998) (perceiving a debate over the role, if any, of “essential terms of a fair social 
contract”). 
Within the constitutional case law, the influence of Justice Chase’s language is at least arguably 
reflected in, for example, Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 143, 143 (1810) (Johnson, J., concurring) (“I do 
not hesitate to declare that a state does not possess the power of revoking its own grants. But I do it on a 
general principle, on the reason and nature of things: a principle which will impose laws even on the 
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In any event, the above-quoted language of Justices Chase27 and Iredell28 
naturally prompts broad reflection on the bases of constitutional law and 
legitimacy. Particularly relevant to our purposes herein is the tendency to read 
Justice Chase’s consistent references to a “social compact”29 or social contract as 
equivalent to, or better expressed in terms of, “natural law.”30 Certainly, though, 
social contract theory and natural law theory are not even close to equivalent. The 
broad tradition of natural law theory need not invoke the idea of a social compact 
or contract, hypothetical or otherwise.31 Rightly or wrongly, contemporary natural 
law and contemporary contractualist or, for that matter, constructivist theories32 
often explicitly seek to develop largely independently of each other. 
Consider, from the contemporary natural law side, the basic formulation of 
Professor John Finnis’ leading natural law view, according to which: 
[t]here is (i) a set of basic practical principles which indicate the basic forms of 
human flourishing as goods to be pursued and realized, and which are in one 
way or another used by everyone who considers what to do, however unsound 
his conclusions; and (ii) a set of basic methodological requirements of practical 
reasonableness (itself one of the basic forms of human flourishing) which 
                                                                                                                                      
 
deity.”). See also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494, 494 (2005) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (referring to Justice Chase’s “great first principles of the social compact” language in the 
constitutional takings context). 
27 See supra text accompanying notes 20−21. 
28 See supra text accompanying note 22. 
29 See supra text accompanying notes 20−21. 
30 See several of the contributions cited supra note 26; see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 65−69 (7th ed. 2013); 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15.1(a), at 794 (5th ed. 2012) (“In the case of Calder v. Bull the Justices for 
the first time engaged in a debate concerning their ability to override legislation on the basis of natural 
law.”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 8.2.1, at 584–85 (3d 
ed. 2006) (characterizing Justice Chase as permitting the violation of neither the Constitution nor of 
“rights that are part of the natural law”). 
31 The classic source of natural law theory, in the work of Thomas Aquinas, bears a closer relationship 
to a general theory of virtue and vice than to any recognizable voluntary social compact theory. For an 
entry into the basic theory, see THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I–II, question 90; question 91, 
art. 2; question 94 (Fathers of English Dominican Province rev. ed. 1920). Note as well the absence of 
any necessary social contract element in John Finnis’s basic statement of a contemporary natural law 
theory, as elaborated in JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 23 (2d ed. 2011). 
32 See infra Section III. 
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distinguish sound from unsound practical thinking and which, when all brought 
to bear, provide the criteria for distinguishing between acts that (always or in 
particular circumstances) are reasonable-all-things-considered, . . . i.e., between 
ways of acting that are morally right or morally wrong—thus enabling one to 
formulate (iii) a set of general moral standards.33 
Let us now ask a rhetorical question: would the natural law theorist above 
somehow be bound to argue that the various basic ways of human flourishing are to 
be determined by some sort of actual or idealized popular agreement or contract on 
such a question? Suppose we were to agree, freely, fairly, unanimously, and after 
long debate, that watching gratuitous animal abuse videos34 is central to a basic 
form of human flourishing. Would that agreement make it so? Would such an 
agreement require a corresponding adjustment in Finnis’ natural law theory?35 
Presumably not. And the most obvious explanation is that for many natural 
law theorists, among a much wider range of moral theorists, some moral, legal, and 
particularly constitutional principles can be more or less true or false basically 
independent of any consensus, contract, or compact of interested parties. Such 
contracting parties can sometimes be, in this sense, genuinely mistaken about 
matters of ethics, social justice, and the moral element embodied in constitutional 
law. For convenience, we shall thus call this natural law view a form, among many 
other forms, of moral realism.36 
We can see some advantages for a society if there were a form of moral 
realism that clearly worked, crucially at a specific decisional level, or at the level of 
reasonably specific, meaningful moral rules or principles. We would then have 
available, if we chose to use it, a functioning moral compass, or even a moral 
Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) system, to guide us typically to morally right, or 
                                                          
 
33 FINNIS, supra note 31, at 23. 
34 For some broader general background, see the animal cruelty video free speech case of United States 
v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
35 For another approach to human flourishing and human goods, drawing in part upon the Aristotelian 
tradition, see PHILIPPA FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS (2006). 
36 For background, see Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Moral Realism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 
(Oct. 3, 2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/; DAVID O. BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS (1989); DAVID ENOCH, TAKING MORALITY SERIOUSLY: A DEFENSE OF 
ROBUST REALISM (2011); Michael Huemer, An Ontological Proof of Moral Realism, 30 SOC. PHIL. & 
POL’Y 259 (2013); Peter Railton, Moral Realism, 95 PHIL. REV. 163 (1986); ROBERT AUDI, THE GOOD 
IN THE RIGHT: A THEORY OF INTUITION AND INTRINSIC VALUE (2005). 
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at least morally permissible, positions, along with a satisfactory reason to be at that 
moral position. Justice Iredell’s broader problem—that natural law, natural right, or 
similar views typically leave us with a spinning or otherwise unreliable moral 
compass dial37—would then be minimized.38 
For our purposes, though, the major problem at this point is that many 
thoughtful writers today do not find any form of moral realism to be convincing, 
whatever the advantages of a viable moral realism might have been. Those who 
reject moral realism, or largely “discoverable” moral truths, do so on a wide variety 
of grounds, and so we refer to such writers generally as moral non-realists.39 Thus 
for many of our best thinkers, no form of natural law, or of moral realism in 
general, is credible, despite any advantages that might attend some form of moral 
realism. 
This state of affairs—a common rejection of any form of moral realism, while 
appreciating the advantages that could flow from a valid and accepted moral 
realism—provides much of the motivation for many versions of moral, political, 
justice-oriented, and constitutional constructivism. Constructivism thus typically 
seeks first to set aside moral realism, as far as possible. Section III immediately 
below thus introduces40 some forms of constructivism, and crucially explores the 
constructivist desire to set moral realism, including natural law theories, aside, 
while typically trying, as well, to retain some of the advantages of moral realism. 
After all, to its credit, moral realism at least aims at a meaningful form of 
legitimacy and seeks to avoid more or less arbitrary or under-justified moral 
decisions. 
                                                          
 
37 See supra text accompanying note 22. 
38 This is not to suggest that the world is largely solving our moral or constitutional problems for us, 
without our invitation to do so, nor that this would be universally welcomed. 
39 Setting aside all sorts of complications, a reasonable sense of the various moral non-realisms can be 
drawn from Richard Joyce, Moral Anti-Realism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (July 30, 2007), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticism, 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 5, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/. An 
extremely selective bibliography, beyond the various works of these two authors, could include: SIMON 
BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASONING (1998); RICHARD GARNER, 
BEYOND MORALITY (1994); ALLAN GIBBARD, THINKING HOW TO LIVE (2003); MARK ELI KALDERON, 
MORAL FICTIONALISM (2007); JOHN MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1977); JESSE 
PRINZ, THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS (2011); CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND 
LANGUAGE (1944). 
40 That is, beyond the brief summary presented supra note 1. 
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III. A BRIEF TOUR OF CONSTRUCTIVISM FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSES 
In general, the main driving force behind constructivism is thus the desire to 
combine the best of two incompatible broad world views, in part through adopting 
procedures that result in the answers to practical problems of ethics and law, rather 
than trying to find the bases of those answers somehow already etched into nature 
or the universe. One recent reviewer crucially characterizes constructivism “as 
trying to ‘split the difference’ between robust realism about morality . . . and 
realism’s [non-realist] opponents.”41 As the reviewer observes, though, “[e]ating 
your cake and having it too is a great thing when you can pull it off, but trying to 
do so exposes such positions to the problems of both alternatives.”42 Seeking the 
best elements of two worlds does not guarantee success in doing so. 
Thus constructivists about morality, unlike moral realists, “doubt or deny that 
there are distinctively moral facts or properties . . . which can be discovered or 
intuited and will provide foundations for ethics.”43 To this extent, constructivists 
thus seek to avoid the problems associated with moral realist theories.44 But 
constructivists also do not entirely abandon the idea of distinctively justifying 
constructivism in general, or its practical application in ethics, social justice, 
constitutional law, or other fields.45 Some constructivists even talk in terms of 
“objectively” justified outcomes of constructivist procedures.46 One could thus say 
                                                          
 
41 Mark LeBar, Review of Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, 122 MIND 1135, 1135 (2013) (book 
review). 
42 Id. 
43 Onora O’Neill, Constructivism in Rawls and Kant, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 347, 
348 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2002) [hereinafter O’Neill, Constructivism]; see, e.g., Laura Papish, The 
Changing Shape of Korsgaard’s Understanding of Constructivism, 45 J. VALUE INQUIRY 451, 451 
(2011) (discussing the work of Christine Korsgaard) (constructivism as seeking to solve practical 
problems rather than to answer theoretical questions); see also Christine Korsgaard, Realism and 
Constructivism in Twentieth Century Moral Philosophy, 28 J. PHIL. RES. 99, 99–122 (2003); ONORA 
O’NEILL, TOWARDS JUSTICE AND VIRTUE: A CONSTRUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF PRACTICAL REASONING 39 
(1996) [hereinafter O’NEILL, TOWARDS JUSTICE AND VIRTUES]; James Stieb, Rorty on Realism and 
Constructivism, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 272, 272 (2005). 
44 For some important critiques of moral realism, see the sources cited supra note 39. For one prominent 
moral realist’s description of a form of anti-realist constructivism, see David O. Brink, Rawlsian 
Constructivism in Moral Theory, 17 CAN. J. PHIL. 71, 72−73 (1987). 
45 See O’Neill, Constructivism, supra note 43, at 348; Onora O’Neill, Constructivism vs. 
Contractualism, 16 RATIO 319, 321 (2003). 
46 See sources cited supra note 45; see also ROBERT S. TAYLOR, RECONSTRUCTING RAWLS: THE 
KANTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 6 (2011); Michael Buckley, The Structure of 
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that constructivism sets aside the idea of discovering largely independently 
preexisting moral or constitutional “truths,” focusing instead on practical solutions 
to perceived practical problems, and on the process-based construction or creation 
of moral or constitutional “truths.”47 
Constructivism thus typically seeks to bypass both the possible 
overambitiousness of any form of moral realism, and the unambitiousness of an 
insufficiently justified or even ultimately arbitrary ethical or constitutional 
perspective. Constructivism instead seeks what is thought to be a more appealing 
third way, or middle ground solution. Whether any such desirable third way can 
actually be marked out, consistently adhered to, and rendered reasonably stable48 
over time is of course an open question. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
Justification in Political Constructivism, 41 METAPHILOSOPHY 669, 672 (2010) (arguing that 
constructivist political principles as potentially balancing the unavoidable dependence of moral 
principles on our own conceptions with those principles’ objective validity in solving practical 
problems); Ben Laurence, Review of Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, NOTRE DAME PHIL. 
REVIEWS (Mar. 11, 2013), http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/38207-constructivism-in-practical-philosophy/. 
John Rawls characterizes what he calls Kantian moral constructivism in similar terms: “Apart 
from the procedure of constructing the principles of justice, there are no moral facts,” but “moral 
objectivity” can still in a limited sense be reached if “understood in terms of a suitably constructed 
social point of view that we can all accept” as free and equal moral persons. John Rawls, Kantian 
Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 519 (1980). 
“Objectivity” in this limited sense is not a matter of detecting a moral truth written into human 
nature, society, or nature itself, but is instead internal to the overall moral constructivist process, 
including our collective sense of what is reasonable for us. See id.; see also Stephen Darwall, Allan 
Gibbard & Peter Railton, Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics: Some Trends, 101 PHIL. REV. 115, 138 (1992); 
but cf. Carla Bagnoli, Introduction to CONSTRUCTIVISM IN ETHICS 3–4 (Carla Bagnoli ed., 2013) 
(distinguishing between “objectivist” and “subjectivist” versions of moral and other normative forms of 
constructivism); Carla Bagnoli, Constructivism in Metaethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 
(Sept. 27, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constructivism-metaethics/; Carla Bagnoli, Starting 
Points: Kantian Constructivism Reassessed, 27 RATIO JURIS 311 (2014). 
47 See Bagnoli, Constructivism in Methaethics, supra note 46, at 1; Buckley, supra note 46, at 672. 
Additionally, see Professor Ronald Dworkin on moral constructivism, to the effect that “[o]n this view, 
moral judgments are constructed, not discovered: they issue from an intellectual device adapted to 
confront practical, not theoretical problems.” RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 63 (2011) 
(referring to the Kantian Categorical Imperative “universalization” technique as well as to John Rawls’ 
“original position” and “veil of ignorance” device). 
48 See LeBar, supra note 41; ONORA O’NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT’S 
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 206 (1989) (referring to critiques, in this respect, of Rawlsian constructivism at 
an early stage, and aspiring to avoid this problem in her own version of moral constructivism). 
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Thinking about constructivism in general, however, can carry us only so far. 
It is possible that what we can rightly say about one version or level of 
constructivism may not be true of another. In particular, constructivism as applied, 
in one way or another, at the constitutional level49 may, for all we yet know, have 
distinctive advantages or disadvantages over related levels of constructivist 
theory.50 
Constructivism can, as we have already begun to see, take many forms.51 The 
forms may vary as to their scope or focus. Thus “we may distinguish between local 
and global constructivist views.”52 Contractual elements of constructivism may be 
either emphasized,53 or else severely downplayed.54 The crucial proceduralist 
elements of constructivism may also be supplemented, to a greater or lesser degree, 
                                                          
 
49 See, e.g., James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV. 211 (1993); 
Heidi Li Feldman, Rawls’s Political Constructivism as a Judicial Heuristic: A Response to Professor 
Allen, 51 FLA. L. REV. 67 (1999); Richard H. Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987). 
50 See Fleming, supra note 49, at 281−83 (distinguishing Rawlsian constitutional constructivism from a 
broader Rawlsian political constructivism); id. at 297 (“The idea is that the Constitution, conceived as 
an embodiment of fair terms of social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and trust among free 
and equal citizens, provides a shared public basis for reasonable political agreement in our morally 
pluralistic constitutional democracy.”). 
51 For some sources on the evolution of Rawls’ interest and focus, see supra note 5. For merely one 
alternative constructivist approach among many, see T.M. SCANLON, BEING REALISTIC ABOUT 
REASONS 90–92 (2014) [hereinafter SCANLON, BEING REALISTIC]; T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO 
EACH OTHER 4 (2000) (articulating the basic Scanlon moral test of being “permitted by principles that 
could not reasonably be rejected” by appropriately motivated persons); and T.M. Scanlon, Precis of 
What We Owe to Each Other, 66 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 159, 160 (2003) (“An action is 
wrong just in case any principle that permitted it would be one that someone could reasonably reject.”). 
But see SCANLON, BEING REALISTIC, supra at 98 (“Although I think that constructivist accounts of 
justice and morality have considerable plausibility, I do not believe that a plausible constructivist 
account for actions in general can be given.”). For a critique of Scanlon’s approach, see Mark Timmons, 
The Limits of Moral Constructivism, 16 RATIO 391 (2003). 
52 Debbie Roberts, Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, 73 ANALYSIS 814, 814 (2013) (reviewing 
JAMES LENMAN & YONATAN SHEMMER, COSTRUCTIVISM IN PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (2012)) 
(distinguishing among constructivist approaches based on the breadth or scope of the domain being 
addressed); see also Laurence, supra note 46 (construing Scanlon’s and Rawls’ constructivism as 
relatively “local” in their scope or domain). 
53 See, e.g., Timmons, supra note 51, at 391 (characterizing Scanlon’s approach); Ronald Milo, 
Contractarian Constructivism, 92 J. PHIL. 181, 184 (1995). 
54 See, e.g., O’Neill, Constructivism, supra note 43. There may be some tendency for those relying 
heavily on contractualism to introduce (additional) non-contractualist elements to fend off criticisms of 
their approach. 
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with nonprocedural substantive assumptions and considerations.55 The degree to 
which constructivism in general may require supplementation with non-
constructivist elements will be controversial. 
We can also attempt specifically to distinguish, say, ethical or moral 
constructivism from political constructivism.56 The idea of applying constructivism 
to the political realm is certainly popular.57 Attempts are sometimes made, as well, 
to focus constructivist methods not so much on ethics, or even on politics, but on 
some understanding of an idea of justice,58 or of social justice.59 Most important for 
our purposes, constructivism can also be applied in narrower and distinctly 
institutional contexts, as at the constitutional or judicial levels.60 John Rawls 
himself refers to an overall “four stage sequence,”61 with complex relationships 
between and among the stages. The four stages, whatever their internal 
complications, begin with the classic Rawlsian veil of ignorance-shrouded62 
original position63 in which basic principles of justice are selected,64 followed 
                                                          
 
55 See Fleming, supra note 49, at 281−97. 
56 See, e.g., 3 TERENCE IRWIN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICS § 1443, at 959 (2011 ed. 2009). 
57 See, e.g., CATRIONA MCKINNON, LIBERALISM AND THE DEFENSE OF POLITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM 
(2002); PERI ROBERTS, POLITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM (2007); Buckley, supra note 46; ADAM CURETON, 
POLITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1642860; George Klosko, Political Constructivism in Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 635 (1997); Jody S. Kraus, Political Liberalism and Truth, 5 LEGAL 
THEORY 45, 51 (1999); Nicholas Tampio, A Defense of Political Constructivism, 11 CONTEMP. POL. 
THEORY 305, 305 (2012) (distinguishing the methods of moral and of political constructivists). 
58 See, e.g., O’NEILL, TOWARDS JUSTICE AND VIRTUES, supra note 43, at 45 (Rawls’ constructivism as 
centered on “justice”); Kraus, supra note 57, at 51 (Rawlsian political constructivism as constructing 
“principles of justice”); Andrew Williams, Justice, Incentives and Constructivism, 21 RATIO 476, 484 
(2008) (Rawlsian “justice as fairness” as a version of constructivism). 
59 See G.A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 274–75 (2008) (addressing “the constructivist 
approach to social justice”). 
60 See sources cited supra note 50. 
61 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 397 (expanded ed. 2005) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM]. 
62 See id. at 397−98; JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT § 6 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) 
[hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS]. 
63 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 397; RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 
62, at § 6. 
64 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 397; RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 
62, at § 13. 
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successively by a constitutional convention stage,65 a legislative stage,66 and finally 
an adjudicative stage,67 with the Rawlsian veil of ignorance being partially and 
progressively lifted at each of the latter stages.68 Let us now turn to Rawls’ version 
of constructivism. 
IV. SOME ELEMENTS OF RAWLS’ DOMINANT VERSION OF 
GENERAL AND SPECIFICALLY CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTIVISM 
A. Introductory Background 
The most sensible approach to constitutional constructivism in particular 
involves a focus on John Rawls’ dominant approach. As Rawls adapted to critical 
commentary over the years, Rawlsian constructivism in general increased in both 
subtlety and in sheer complexity. No brief account can, at this point, do it justice. 
Herein, we address only as much of Rawls’ approach as is necessary to develop a 
responsible critique thereof, with an eye secondarily toward the possibility of other, 
non-Rawlsian forms of constitutional constructivism. 
Rawls, as we saw above,69 seeks to distinguish the “first stage” basic 
principles of justice from the “later stage” provisions of the constitution of a 
reasonably just society.70 In turn, the constitution itself, or the fruits of a 
constitutional convention,71 are then to be specifically distinguished from the 
separate stage of the processes and outcomes of constitutional adjudication.72 
Crucially for our purposes, the outcomes reached at each separate Rawlsian stage 
are intended to be not merely abstractly appealing, but to be reasonably stable in 
practice over generations.73 
                                                          
 
65 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 397. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. at 397−98. 
68 See id. at 398. For a brief summary of this Rawlsian four stage constructivist process, see Leif 
Werner, John Rawls § 4.9, http://stanford.library.usyd.edu.au/entries/rawls/. 
69 See supra notes 62−69 and accompanying text. 
70 See supra notes 65−66 and accompanying text. 
71 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
72 See supra notes 66, 68 and accompanying text. 
73 See, e.g., RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 140−44; RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, 
supra note 62, at 180−202. 
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Without providing a detailed description of Rawls’ constructivism at any of 
the four stages, we can nonetheless start with Rawls’ famous two principles of 
justice, as they are thought to emerge from the “first stage” original position.74 
These principles, in their order of ethical priority, hold that 
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of 
equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of 
liberties for all; and 
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are 
to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be of the greatest benefit to the 
least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).75 
In turn, the later constitutional, legislative, and adjudicative stages are then to have 
a complex and subtle relation to these two basic principles, and among one 
another.76 
A broad critique of even these two basic “first stage” principles of justice 
would be a treatise in itself.77 Our focus herein is instead primarily on Rawlsian 
constructivism at the constitutional level, and then only to make a few key points of 
general interest. The other stages of Rawlsian constructivism will be referred to 
only for limited purposes. We begin to explore some inescapable problems for 
Rawlsian constructivism below. 
B. The Key Rawlsian Ideas as Unfortunately “Essentially 
Contested” 
The first problem begins with the fact that at every stage of Rawlsian 
constructivism, concrete meanings for the basic ideas of freedom, liberty, and 
equality must be constructed. Rawls has complex, multifaceted purposes for 
choosing from among the various possible meanings of these and other crucial 
                                                          
 
74 For the original formulation, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE §§ 11–14 (1972). 
75 RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 62, § 13, at 42−43. 
76 See supra notes 62–74 and accompanying text. 
77 For an example of broader studies, see PAUL WEITHMAN, WHY POLITICAL LIBERALISM? ON JOHN 
RAWLS’S POLITICAL TURN (Oxford Univ. Press 2013); see also SAMUEL FREEMAN, RAWLS (2007); 
G.A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY (2009). 
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terms.78 But even if we assume that Rawls’ constructive methodology itself drives 
his understanding of these key terms, the meaning of each of these terms for every 
decision maker unfortunately remains “essentially contested.”79 
The problem is that once Rawls provides the choice-makers, at any of the four 
stages, with enough information to make a meaningful choice regarding, say, 
questions of liberty or equality, a classic “essential contestability” problem 
unavoidably arises. Roughly, the essential contestability problem is that even if we 
all choose to adopt Rawls’ most basic aims, there will arise unresolvable basic 
disputes as to the practical meaning and implications of the terms at issue. Those 
disputes as to meaning cannot be resolved by thinking harder about those terms, or 
by further good faith discussions. 
As merely one concrete “essential contestability” example, consider the views 
not of a libertarian, of a classical liberal, or of any sort of conservative, but of the 
basically politically sympathetic Professor Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin, quite unlike 
Rawls,80 denies that there are any basic conflicts between the values of freedom 
and equality in their highest and best senses.81 Specifically, Dworkin argues that 
“liberty isn’t the freedom to do whatever you might want to do; it’s freedom to do 
whatever you like so long as you respect the moral rights of others.”82 On this 
view, liberty thus cannot possibly involve violating the moral rights of another 
person. Clearly, whether Rawls can, in contrast, define liberty completely 
independently of any moral rights of others or not, there is no neutral, objectively 
right answer to the conflict between Rawls and Dworkin on this crucial point.83 
                                                          
 
78 For a mere beginning to this task, see RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 62, at §§ 7.1, 13.4. 
79 See generally W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN 
SOC’Y 167 (1956); see also WILLIAM CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 10–44 (2d ed. 
1984); John Gray, On Liberty, Liberalism, and Essential Contestability, 8 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 385 (1978); 
Alasdair MacIntyre, The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts, 84 ETHICS 1 (1973); David-
Hillel Ruben, W.B. Gallie and Essentially Contested Concepts, 39 PHIL. PAPERS 259 (2010); Jeremy 
Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137 (2002); 
but cf. Christine Swanton, On the “Essential Contestedness” of Political Concepts, 95 ETHICS 811, 811 
(1985) (entertaining some doubts in this regard). Loosely relatedly, see the discussion of Rawls’ idea of 
“public reason” in FRED D’AGOSTINO, FREE PUBLIC REASON: MARKING IT UP AS WE GO ch. 2 (1996). 
80 See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 62, at 2. 
81 RONALD DWORKIN, Do Liberal Values Conflict?, in THE LEGACY OF ISAIAH BERLIN 73, 83−84 (Mark 
Lilla et al. eds., 2001). 
82 Id. 
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This inherent lack of closure as to meaning plagues Rawlsian constructivism on the 
similarly essentially contested ideas of equality of opportunity, of the value of 
liberty, and elsewhere. 
C. Some Incoherence Among the Four Constructed Rawlsian 
Stages 
A second and related problem is that Rawls’ attempts at moderate, realistic, 
pragmatic, restrained, and stability-inducing constructivist arguments actually 
create problems of incoherence within his overall account of the four stages as 
severe as some of his bolder constructivist steps. 
Consider, for example, Rawls’ insistence that the first principle of justice 
mentioned above, that of protecting equal liberties and their worth,84 must be 
enshrined and entrenched at the later stage of constitution-making,85 but that for 
various reasons,86 the second principle of justice,87 addressing social and economic 
opportunities and inequalities, need not be similarly written into the constitution.88 
What may initially seem like a Rawlsian nod to pragmatism, moderation, 
consensus-building, or stability actually dissolves, however, into incoherence. 
There is initial plausibility to this Rawlsian arrangement, since the first 
principle of justice does explicitly take moral precedence over the second.89 As 
                                                                                                                                      
 
83 For background on this enduring, irresolvable basic conflict over the meaning of liberty, see Isaiah 
Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 166 (Henry 
Hardy ed., 2d ed. 2002). For evidence of the similarly unresolvable dispute over the meaning and 
implications of equality, contrast Rawls’ views with the (non-metaphysical) views of JOHN KEKES, THE 
ILLUSIONS OF EGALITARIANISM 46−48 (2007) (Rawls’ minimizing the roles of desert, responsibility, 
praiseworthiness, and blameworthiness as ultimately leading to unattractive logical conclusions); 
FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION ch. 6 (Ronald Hamowy 
ed., 2011). Appealing to a process of “reflective equilibrium,” as in RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, 
supra note 62, at § 10, largely just reconfirms the essential contestability of crucial Rawlsian concepts. 
On the proper role, or lack thereof, of moral deservingness, see GEORGE SHER, DESERT ch. 2 (1989) 
(discussing Rawls). 
84 See supra text passage (a) accompanying note 76. 
85 See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 62, at 42−49; RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra 
note 61, at 227−29, 336−37. 
86 See sources cited supra note 86. 
87 See supra text passage (b) accompanying note 76. 
88 See the sources cited supra note 86. 
89 See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 62, at 43. 
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constructed, Rawls’ theory is in the position of constitutionally protecting equal 
basic liberties and their value for all, along a publicly provided social minimum for 
all persons, and the equal protection of rights under the law, or equal protection. 
But Rawls then very explicitly does not necessarily protect, at the same 
constitutional stage, “fair equality of opportunity”90 as embodied in the second 
principle of justice.91 Fair equality of opportunity, but not equal liberties and their 
value or the equal protection of rights under the law, is thus left vulnerable to the 
contingencies of possible legislative, sub-constitutional level enactments.92 
While there is a formalistic rigor about these Rawlsian constructivist moves, 
their overall practical coherence is extremely doubtful at best. What would it look 
like, on Rawls’ constructivist approach, to constitutionally guarantee the equal 
provision of basic liberties and their value, and the equal protection of the laws, but 
at the same time to deny constitutional protection to fair equality of opportunity? 
On almost any sensible set of definitions of the key terms, this combination of 
constitutional guarantees and their lack makes little sense. What would it look like 
to arbitrarily bar a group from, say, some important work, or from some important 
educational option, while at the same time supposedly upholding that group’s equal 
protection rights, along with the fair value of their basic liberties? This combination 
of rights, and lack of rights, is meaningless. If this incoherent state of affairs were 
even imaginable, how likely is it that fair-minded legislators, citizens, or judges 
could, under any set any procedures, remotely approach free agreement on whether 
this curious combination of rights had been met in various cases?93 
D. The Realistic Inseparability of the Four Supposedly Distinct 
Rawlsian Constructivist Stages 
A third, and again closely related, problem is illustrated by Rawls’ attempt to 
distinguish between, and assign different constructed functions to, the four different 
                                                          
 
90 See id. at 42, 43. 
91 See sources cited supra note 86; see also Fleming, supra note 49, at 286. 
92 See Fleming, supra note 49, at 286. 
93 For general background, see the various opinions, especially that of Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, in 
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). We might also wonder 
whether this odd implication of Rawls’ constructivism would add to the prospects of genuine social 
stability as much as to subtract therefrom. 
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sequential stages of public decision making referred to above.94 The four Rawlsian 
constructivist stages are, inescapably, inseparable. 
Of most direct relevance for our purposes is the distinction Rawls seeks to 
draw between a hypothetical idealized constitutional convention or a constitutional 
drafting stage95 on the one hand, and then a separate later stage of more or less 
idealized judicial interpretation of the previously adopted constitution.96 For some 
purposes, certainly there is little harm in drawing this thoroughly familiar 
distinction. Problems arise, however, when Rawls invests too heavily in this 
distinction between the constitution itself and constitutional case adjudication, as a 
substantive or genuinely functional, rather than a largely formal, distinction.97 
The meaningfulness of any clear, functional distinction between the 
Constitution itself and a court’s adjudication of a constitutional case, on whatever 
theory, has rightly been implicitly called into question by a number of scholars.98 
There is thus little point in Rawls’ explicitly constructing one set of informational 
limits, constraints and tasks for one stage, and another set for the another “later” 
stage,99 if in the most interesting cases the two stages cannot realistically be 
disentangled.100 
For the sake of clarity, let us briefly consider this stage-inseparability problem 
at the level of constitutional case law adjudication. Do the major historical 
constitutional cases consistently reflect a practical distinction between either the 
product of a constitution or a constitutional convention on the one hand, and 
constitutional case adjudication on the other? Would this distinction really become 
substantially clearer if all of Rawls’ constructivist constraints, including the 
                                                          
 
94 See supra notes 62−77 and accompanying text. 
95 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 397. 
96 See id. at 398. 
97 See id. 
98 See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: 
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1984) (six types of recognized constitutional argument); RONALD 
DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1997); DAVID A. STRAUSS, 
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008). 
99 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 398. 
100 See sources cited supra note 99. 
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varying and limited roles at each stage101 for the two principles of justice, were 
imposed? 
We might well ask, then, at the level of historical, admittedly non-Rawlsian 
practice, about significant particular pairs of actual judicial cases. Can we detect, 
for example, a relevant, clear distinction between, say, the Constitution itself on the 
one hand, and the constitutional adjudication, on the other hand, of the racial 
segregation cases of both Plessy v. Ferguson102 and Brown v. Board of 
Education?103 Did neither case seek, on its own lights, to develop, build, or give 
substance to, rather than to follow or somehow respect, a preexisting Constitution? 
How about the scope of the Commerce Clause power, as delimited in both Carter 
v. Carter Coal104 and, a year later, in the Jones & Laughlin Steel case?105 Or 
economic substantive Due Process as addressed, in opposing fashions, in 
Lochner106 and in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish?107 Or consider the Equal Protection 
and substantive Due Process cases of Bowers v. Hardwick108 and Lawrence v. 
Texas.109 In the Religion Clause area, there are Wisconsin v. Yoder110 and the 
sacramental peyote-ingestion Smith111 case. And in the area of freedom of speech, 
we might jointly consider the Debs112 and Brandenburg113 subversive advocacy 
cases. Any drafted constitution and its associated case law are, realistically, 
inseparable. This will be true even where case law addresses vague provisions or 
                                                          
 
101 See supra notes 62−77 and accompanying text. 
102 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
103 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
104 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
105 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
106 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), abrogated by Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 
483 (1955). 
107 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
108 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
109 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers). 
110 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
111 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (seeking to distinguish Yoder). 
112 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
113 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (radically expanding the limited First Amendment rights 
accorded in Debs). 
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makes a “dead letter” of some particular constitutional provision, thereby 
establishing or changing the realistic meaning of the constitution itself. 
In some or all of these cases, the Supreme Court may have failed to justify the 
outcome through the use of what is called Rawlsian “public reason.”114 But if so, 
this would not rescue the Rawlsian supposed functional distinction between the 
constitution itself and the courts. It is difficult to imagine all of the great issues of 
the day being candidly and meaningfully judicially addressed, let alone justly 
resolved, without even implicit judicial reliance on metaphysical views that are not 
universally shared among reasonable persons. Nor is it easy to imagine an adopted 
constitutional text with no implied reliance on metaphysics unshared among 
reasonable persons. But even a constitution and a series of constitutional 
adjudications in strict accordance with shared metaphysical views, held on identical 
grounds, would inevitably merge in ways sufficient to render unrealistic the idea of 
different Rawlsian constructivist standards for a constitutional stage and a 
constitutional adjudication stage. 
E. The Crucial Problem of Constructed Constitutional Stability 
and the Role of Broad Basic Virtues 
A fourth, and for our purposes most important, problem focuses on whether 
Rawls’ constitutional constructivism in particular has the resources to sustain itself 
in practice over a substantial period of time. Our focus here is not on the 
destabilizing possibility of some external threat, natural disaster, or on 
uncompromising political or religious extremists, but on ordinary constitutional 
and related governmental processes and outcomes. We refer here to matters such as 
constitutional regime performance, regime legitimacy, regime authority, and public 
trust over the course of time, as such matters in practice might play out. Briefly put, 
this is a problem of constitutional constructivist regime stability over time. To 
loosely paraphrase Rousseau, we shall, for purposes of investigating regime 
                                                          
 
114 For our purposes, “public reason” would exclude political outcomes justified only through some 
comprehensive metaphysical, religious, or other such perspectives not generally shared by, or agreed 
with on any grounds by, the conscientious citizenry. For broad discussion, see RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at Part II, Lecture VI & Part IV. In the specific context of Supreme Court 
adjudication, see id. at 231–40. See also RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 62, at § 26; John 
Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political, Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 223 (1985), 
available at http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Philosophy%20167/Rawlsjusticeas 
fairness.pdf/ (“[I]n a constitutional democracy the public conception of justice should be, so far as 
possible, independent of controversial philosophical and religious doctrines.”). 
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stability, rather largely take persons as they are, and the laws as Rawls would have 
them.115 
The temptation for the constitutional constructivist, especially given the 
underlying Rawlsian vision of justice as fairness, is to assume that constitutional 
and regime legitimacy, authority, public trust, and stability should follow readily 
from the constructed justice of the system, at least if the citizenry displays a 
sufficient commitment to public reasonableness, and a certain measure of Rawlsian 
civic virtue.116 
The basic problem, though, is that over the long term, the stability of any 
form of constructivist constitutionalism is likely to depend, parasitically, on a 
largely unacknowledged, deeper, and more extensive role for a number of 
inescapably vital and familiar broad basic virtues, whose status as broad virtues is 
far more “real” and deeply objective than merely consensual or constructed. 
This concern does not depend upon any unusual definitions of a regime or 
constitutional legitimacy, authority, public trust, or stability.117 Any standard 
definitions will suffice. Almost at random, we could say that legitimacy involves 
“the widespread public belief that the society’s governing institutions and political 
authorities are worthy of support,”118 in ways arguably bearing on broad political 
                                                          
 
115 See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 49 (Maurice Cranston trans., 1968) (1762). 
Rawls adopts a rather similar approach, in another context, in JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 7 
(2001). 
116 See, e.g., RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 62, at 116−18 (referring to “a spirit of 
compromise and a readiness to meet others halfway”); RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, 
at 194 (“[J]ustice as fairness includes an account of certain political virtues—virtues of fair social 
cooperation such as the virtues of civility and tolerance, of reasonableness and the sense of fairness.”). 
117 For brief overviews of the ideas of political legitimacy and of political authority respectively, see 
Fabienne Peter, Political Legitimacy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Apr. 29, 2010), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/ (distinguishing between procedural and substantive or 
outcome-focused elements of legitimacy), and Tom Christiano, Authority, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 
(rev. ed., Jan. 11, 2012), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/authority/. For the classic 
discussion of forms of authority and legitimacy, see MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 130, 325 (A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947); see also LESLIE 
GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 1 (1990) (explaining Weber’s view that a widespread belief in a 
regime’s legitimacy tends to enhance regime effectiveness and stability). On some relevant conceptions 
of (public) trust, see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF 
PROSPERITY (1996) (explaining the cultural and economic productivity effects of social trust and its role 
as social capital). 
118 Bert Useem & Michael Useem, Governmental Legitimacy and Political Stability, 57 SOCIAL FORCES 
840, 840 (1979). 
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stability.119 In a basic sociological sense, the current United States Constitution in 
particular “is legitimate insofar as it is accepted (as a matter of fact) as deserving of 
respect or obedience. . . .”120 And even in this sociological sense, “there can be no 
doubt that legitimacy is a vital thing to have, and illegitimacy a condition devoutly 
to be avoided.”121 
For our purposes, we can simply assume that a form of Rawlsian 
constructivism, at the constitutional and other levels,122 has somehow been duly 
adopted with the broad initial approval of the public, whatever their personal 
philosophical or religious views might be. No regime, of course, is guaranteed high 
and continuing levels of general endorsement or broad confidence. Constitutional 
and other governmental legitimacy;123 general public optimism about the future;124 
and social and intergenerational125 trust126 cannot be taken for granted, for example, 
by elected governments under current conditions. 
                                                          
 
119 See id. 
120 Richard H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1790 (2005). 
121 Robert W. Tucker & David C. Hendrickson, The Sources of American Legitimacy, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 
18, 18 (2004); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 62 (2006) (“Citizens who view legal 
authority as legitimate are generally more likely to obey the law.”). 
122 See supra notes 62−69 and accompanying text. 
123 See, e.g., DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 315 (20th anniv. ed. 
1996) (referring to a “loss of civitas, which makes respect for the law possible”). 
124 See, for example, the widespread sense that the nation is headed “off on the wrong track” as opposed 
to “the right direction,” with at best limited public confidence levels in most major institutions, 
including the Supreme Court. HART RESEARCH ASSOCIATES/PUBLIC OPINION STRATEGIES, STUDY 
#15028, at 2 (Jan. 14–17, 2015), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJNBCpoll 
01192014.pdf. 
125 See, e.g., BELL, supra note 123, at 318 (“Every generation of Americans had expected that they 
would build a better life for their children than they themselves had. This may no longer be the case.”); 
Chris Cilizza, Is the American Dream Dead?, WASH. POST, June 5, 2014, available at http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/06/05/is-the-american-dream-dead/ (the majority, believing 
that the next generation will not be as well off as the previous generation, reduced public confidence in 
the Supreme Court and other institutions); David Davenport, Honey, I Shrank the Deficit (But Grew the 
National Debt), FORBES.COM (Apr. 20, 2014), available at http://forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/ 
2014/04/24/honey-i-shrank-the-deficit-but-grew-the-national-debt-2/; Philip Klein, Trustees Say Long-
Run Medicare, Social Security Deficit Is $66 Trillion, WASH. EXAMINER (May 31, 2013), available at 
http://washingtonexaminer.com/trustees-say-long-run-medicare-social-security-deficit-is-66-trillion/ 
article/2530908/; Rick Lyman & Mary Williams Walsh, Public Pension Tabs Multiply as States Defer 
Costs and Hard Choices, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/02/25/us/efforts-to-rein-in-public-sector-pension-costs-are-falling-short-experts-say.html?_r=0/ 
(noting the widespread and resilient tendency to defer costs of pension underfunding to the future). 
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The main concern is not that a Rawlsian constitutional or broadly political 
constructivism would inherit any preexisting public pessimism, or either 
generalized or specifically intergenerational distrust. We can assume that Rawlsian 
constructivism, in practice, could inherit a clean slate, indeed universal popularity, 
in every respect. Our focus is instead on whether a Rawlsian constitutional 
constructivist regime would likely retain its integrity, coherence, and the assumed 
initial public support, in reasonably stable fashion, in the long term. 
Rawls recognizes that even if we metaphorically assume away any citizens 
who fundamentally reject the most basic assumptions of Rawlsian justice, the 
principles of justice are not automatically self-implementing or self-sustaining over 
time. Rawls appreciates that a constitutionally and otherwise just and stable society 
requires certain sorts of public or civic virtue among public officials and the 
citizenry. Thus there must be “a spirit of compromise and a readiness to meet 
others halfway.”127 Rawls also emphasizes “the virtues of fair social cooperation 
such as the virtues of civility and tolerance, of reasonableness and the sense of 
fairness.”128 Each comprehensive or metaphysically-motivated philosophical or 
religious group may emphasize particular virtues,129 and various associations, 
organizations, and groups may also emphasize particular virtues,130 but beyond the 
above “officially endorsed” Rawlsian civic virtues focusing on cooperative mutual 
tolerance131 and mutual civic trust,132 the risk looms, according to Rawls, of 
                                                                                                                                      
 
126 See, e.g., BELL, supra note 123, at 315 (referring to “a rising distrust of politics—and even of the 
political system”); PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN AND HOW IT CAN DO 
BETTER 1–17 (2014) (on various dimensions of diminishing public trust in federal government); 
ROBERT NISBET, TWILIGHT OF AUTHORITY 2–16 (1975) (arguing to similar effect); JAMES S. SCOTT, 
SEEING LIKE A STATE 351 (1989) (noting the importance of levels of social and interpersonal bonds of 
trust, apart from legally enforceable contracts); Trust in Institutions and the Political Process, HARV. 
UNIV. INST. POLS. (Apr. 29, 2014), available at http://www.iop.harvard.edu/trust (“[C]ompared to one 
year ago, the level of trust that young Americans between 18 and 29 years old have in most American 
institutions tested in our survey has dissipated compared even to last year’s historically low numbers.”). 
127 RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 62, at 116−18. Rawls would seem to implicitly require us 
to display the virtue of practical wisdom in deciding who is and who is not to be met “halfway” or even 
part of the way, or fully accommodated, on which issues, and in deciding what constitutes “halfway,” 
statically or over time. It is important that such decisions not be impaired by unnecessarily poor 
judgment or by the vice of public cowardice. 
128 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 194; see also id. at 195 n.29 (referring to the 
political or civic virtues as necessary for “a just and stable constitutional regime”). 
129 See id. at 195. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. 
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establishing what is called a “perfectionist”133 state, in which some particular 
controversial view or views of a life well-lived is imposed on the citizenry.134 
Rawls thus seeks what he takes to be a middle ground between two extremes: 
a just society that refuses to sustain itself even by socializing the citizenry to its 
own most basic principles135 and that ignores the potential for the principles of 
justice to themselves further promote the sustaining civic virtues,136 and, at the 
other extreme, a society that risks illiberal “perfectionism” by building certain more 
or less controversial purported virtues into the governmental basic structure.137 
The crucial question is thus whether Rawls’ “thin” conception of, and 
corresponding role for, his civic virtues sufficiently promotes the long-term 
stability of the constitutionally and otherwise just society. Rawls sees the basic 
principles of justice, and a proper socialization to the “thin” civic virtues above, as 
mutually supportive.138 And he again seeks to avoid an otherwise just society that 
builds controversial “thicker” conceptions of virtue—perhaps like that of the 
martialized honor-based Sparta of Socrates’ time139—into its governing structure. 
All else equal, though, is this really a sufficient role for virtues and virtue-thinking 
in a stable, just society? 
There is good reason to suspect not. And this is a central problem not only for 
Rawlsian constitutional constructivism, but for any constitutional constructivism 
that seeks as far as possible to set moral realism aside.140 Over the long term, the 
“thin” civic virtues referred to by Rawls, even if widely inculcated, are not enough 
for the reasonable stability of a just society. The Rawlsian just constitution, in 
particular, would instead require the widespread, active support of a range of 
                                                                                                                                      
 
132 See id; RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 62, at 117. 
133 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 195. 
134 See id. 
135 See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 62, at 124−25. 
136 See id. at 126. 
137 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 195. 
138 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
139 See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 265−73 (Francis M. Cornford trans., 1967) (c. 370 B.C.E.) (Socrates 
discussing the character of the person, and the corresponding character of the society, dominated for a 
time by a conception of honor (timocracy)). 
140 See supra notes 1, 42−48 and accompanying text. 
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familiar basic virtues that rely upon just the sort of moral realism that constitutional 
constructivism seeks to set aside or bypass.141 
The moral realism and deep moral objectivity of the basic virtues that 
constructivism disastrously underplays requires brief further discussion below.142 
But first, let us consider how the very process of recognizing and applying the 
“thin” Rawlsian civic virtues itself actually depends, in unacknowledged ways, on 
more deeply moral objective underlying basic virtues. 
Consider, for example, the Rawlsian civic virtues of a willingness, where 
justice itself is not put at risk, to compromise,143 to meet others halfway,144 or to 
display tolerance.145 We will here simply assume these qualities to be virtues, in 
their proper place and proper measure. But once we make this concession, the 
deeper problem then comes into view: Knowing when and how, or how far, to 
carry these thin Rawlsian civic virtues inescapably requires other, more deeply 
objective virtues that unavoidably carry us back into moral realism. The proper role 
and implementation of the Rawlsian civic virtues in actual practice will not be self-
evident, especially where claims to arguable constitutional rights come into 
conflict, or where the scope of constitutional rights is far from clear.146 There may 
well be some role for merely constructed principles in deciding such inherently 
inexact matters. But the crucial role in deciding all such matters must be played by 
classic broad objective virtues, including, in particular, the classic general virtue of 
practical wisdom.147 And the crucial role of practical wisdom or broad prudence not 
                                                          
 
141 See supra notes 1, 42−48. 
142 See infra notes 158−62. 
143 See supra notes 117, 128 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra notes 117, 128 and accompanying text. 
145 See supra notes 117, 129 and accompanying text. 
146 See, for example, the arguments on protection of religious and secular conscience in RONALD 
DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013); BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013); 
JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE (Jane Marie 
Todd trans., 2011); Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Conscience as Religious and Moral Freedom, 29 J.L. 
& RELIG. 124 (2014). 
147 See, for background, the discussion of practical wisdom, or phronesis, in PLATO, supra note 139, at 
121–22 (wisdom as a key virtue of, not coincidentally, both individual persons and the city-state itself); 
ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V1, at 150–51 (J.A.K. Thomson trans., rev. ed. 2004) (c. 
350 B.C.E.) (practical wisdom, preserved by the virtue of temperance, as allowing insight into what is 
good for the city-state); RAYMOND J. DEVETTERE, INTRODUCTION TO VIRTUE ETHICS: INSIGHTS OF THE 
ANCIENT GREEKS 122 (2002) (prudence as the crucial virtue for sound legislation and public rule-
making); JOSEPH PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES xii, 32 (Richard & Clara Winston trans., 1966) 
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surprisingly extends beyond constitution drafters and legislators to the courts and 
judges.148 
Constructed rules or principles and the thin Rawlsian civic virtues commonly 
do not interpret and apply themselves. Instead, politicians, constitutional judges,149 
and administrative officials are all subject to the truth that “[o]ccasion by occasion, 
one knows what to do, if one does, not by applying universal principles, but by 
being a certain kind of person: one who sees situations in a certain distinctive 
way.”150 More controversially, it has even been urged in particular that “the 
bourgeois virtues . . . have been the causes . . . of modern economic growth and of 
modern political freedom.”151 
Suppose, though, that constructivists—who again typically set aside questions 
of moral realism152—could be persuaded to expand the role, at the constitutional 
and other levels, of the various basic classic virtues. After all, Rawls himself 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(1959); ROBERT C. ROBERTS & W. JAY WOOD, INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES: AN ESSAY IN REGULATIVE 
EPISTEMOLOGY 306 (2009) (the virtue of practical wisdom as necessary in order to translate abstract 
general principles into well-tailored responses to particular circumstances and contexts); Philip Bricker, 
Prudence, 77 J. PHIL. 381 (1980); H.J.N. Horsburgh, Prudence, 36 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 51, 66 
(Supp. vol. 1962); Richard Kraut, The Rationality of Prudence, 81 PHIL. REV. 351, 351 (1972); Nathan 
Rotenstreich, Prudence and Folly, 22 AM. PHIL. Q. 93, 93 (1985). For a useful mainstream definition of 
virtue in general, see MARK TIMMONS, MORAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 270 (2d ed. 2013). 
148 See in particular the discussion by Yale Law School Dean Anthony Kronman of the widely respected 
Professor Alexander Bickel: “It was Bickel’s view that prudence is an indispensable condition for 
success in the activities of both the politician and the judge; indeed, Bickel believed prudence to be the 
defining excellence of their respective crafts.” Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of 
Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1569 (1985). For further perspective on the role of the virtue of prudence 
in the constitutional process, see Edward F. McClennen, Prudence and Constitutional Rights, 63 AM. J. 
ECON. & SOC. 213 (2004). 
149 For discussion of the role of classic virtues in constitutional adjudication, regardless of the text of the 
Constitution, see R. George Wright, Constitutional Cases and the Four Cardinal Virtues, 60 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 195 (2012) [hereinafter Wright, Constitutional Cases]. 
150 Roger Crisp, Particularizing Particularism, in MORAL PARTICULARISM 23, 23 (Brad Hooker & 
Margaret Little eds., 2003) (quoting John McDowell, Virtue and Reason, in VIRTUE ETHICS 141, 162 
(Roger Crisp & Michael Slote eds., 1997)); see also JONATHAN DANCY, ETHICS WITHOUT PRINCIPLES 
ch. 1 (2004); David Bakhurst, Ethical Particularism in Context, in MORAL PARTICULARISM 157 (Brad 
Hooker & Margaret Little eds., 2003); R. George Wright, Dreams and Formulas: The Roles of 
Particularism and Principlism in the Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 195 (2008). 
151 DEIDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE BOURGEOISE VIRTUES: ETHICS FOR AN AGE OF COMMERCE 22 (2007). 
152 See supra notes 1, 42−50 and accompanying text. 
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focuses on justice,153 and justice in one sense is actually among the classic personal 
virtues.154 Let us notice, though, the monumental difference between, say, Rawls’ 
two basic rules or principles of justice,155 and the classic virtue-based account of 
justice as, instead, a personal disposition to accord to every other person neither 
more nor less than what is due to that person.156 
But let us now suppose that Rawlsian constitutional constructivism were 
modified in such a way as to provide a more substantial role for one or more of the 
classic basic virtues, as appropriately broadly defined. What would then be the cost 
of doing so, in specifically constructivist terms? 
Importantly, it would then become very difficult for the constitutional 
constructivist to continue to claim to be largely declining to take sides on questions 
of moral realism and non-realism.157 In the sense in which we intend them, broad 
virtues158 such as prudence or practical wisdom, fortitude, temperance as a 
reasonable degree of self-restraint over time, and justice as defined above159 seem 
more recognizable than merely invented, and thus understood best in terms of 
moral realism. It may well be that one or more of even the “thin” Rawlsian civic 
virtues160 should also best be thought of in moral realist, non-constructed terms. 
The main point is instead that classic virtues such as, say, fortitude or 
practical wisdom at basic levels seem most naturally understood on some 
inescapably moral realist approach. Any society could, technically, choose to 
define fortitude, as a supposed virtue, in terms of panicking before any obstacle, or 
as denying the reality of any obstacle, or in any other obviously self-defeating way. 
Practical wisdom could similarly be defined in terms of adopting popular but self-
                                                          
 
153 See much of the overall Rawlsian normative work, beginning with JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE (1972). 
154 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (David Ross trans., 1925) (J.L. Ackrill & J.O. 
Urmson rev. trans., 1980) (c. 350 B.C.E.); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Francis M. Cornford trans., 1967) (c. 
370 B.C.E.). 
155 See supra text accompanying note 76. 
156 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 155. 
157 See supra notes 1, 42−50 and accompanying text, and notes 37, 40 and their accompanying text 
(discussing forms of moral non-realism). 
158 See supra notes 148−50 and accompanying text. 
159 See supra notes 155, 157 and accompanying text. 
160 See supra text accompanying notes 128−29. 
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destructive illusion, or as a purely arbitrary conventional notion, or in terms almost 
entirely of emotion or attitudes rather than belief, or even in terms of beliefs 
inescapably relying on obvious fiction.161 
And there is obviously some role for cultural variation, at some level, in the 
concrete meanings of the virtues. But when the chips are down, we think of the 
basic virtues as more or less genuinely recognizable, given our nature, our basic 
aims, our basic capacities and vulnerabilities, and our basic circumstances, rather 
than as largely subjective or ultimately arbitrary. They are recognized, far more 
than invented, at a broad level, even though they relativistically vary across 
different cultures. 
Moral realism regarding basic virtues is thus much more difficult to set aside 
than constructivists typically assume. But do constructivists, including Rawls, 
really sacrifice much, particularly in terms of the stability of the constitutionally 
just society, by downplaying the role of various classic, objective basic virtues? 
Practical wisdom, for example, inescapably does seem to be among the virtues to 
be valued in a just government official, as well as in the citizenry. But let us focus, 
more narrowly, as a specific test, on merely one important and long-standing 
element of Rawlsian justice, the question of a just saving rate across generations.162 
The Rawlsian principle of a just saving rate unavoidably has significant equal 
protection and other constitutional implications.163 On Rawls’ theory, the initial 
choosers are to select a principle establishing a rate of real societal saving, for the 
sake of justice, but without those choosers knowing their own historical position, 
and thus without an incentive to free-ride or to exploit earlier or later generations 
unjustly.164 What is chosen is not a particular numerical saving rate, applicable for 
all relevant generations, forward and backward in time, but a broader principle to 
determine a just saving rate under relevant circumstances.165 
                                                          
 
161 See some possible lines of development suggested, loosely, by the sources cited supra note 40. 
162 See, e.g., RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 274; RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, 
supra note 62, at 159−61. For a recent broader treatment of various related issues, see 
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE (Axel Grosseries & Lucas Meyer eds., 2009). 
163 For background, see Wright, Constitutional Cases, supra note 149, at 207−09. 
164 See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 62, at 159−60. 
165 Thus Rawls indicates that, 
[t]he correct principle . . . is one the members of any generation (and so all 
generations) would adopt as the principle they would want preceding 
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A just saving rate itself is thus, as the term suggests, a matter of a just 
principle, as then applied under variant historical and economic circumstances. The 
rate itself may thus vary across generations. As Rawls expresses the point, “[r]eal 
saving is required only for reasons of justice: that is, to make possible the 
conditions needed to establish and to preserve a just basic structure over time.”166 
The aim is thus at justice, rather than at even modest economic development 
beyond or independent of justice,167 whatever additional savings a society may 
choose for other reasons.168 
Thus on Rawls’ approach, once just institutions have been established, and 
provision has been made for financially sustaining those just institutions, “net real 
savings may fall to zero.”169 Rawls explicitly notes in particular that “[w]e do not 
want to rule out Mill’s idea of a society in a just stationary state where (real) capital 
accumulation may cease.”170 
We have no serious objection here to Rawls’ just saving doctrine itself, or to 
anything like it.171 The problem is instead that the just saving doctrine, like every 
other Rawlsian principle, must be rendered concrete, refined, implemented, and 
administered at all relevant stages and levels, under circumstances of inevitable 
complexity, temptation to subconscious bias, and uncertainty. Under just such 
                                                                                                                                      
 
generations to have followed, no matter how far back in time. Since no 
generation knows its place among the generations, this implies that all later 
generations, including the present one, are to follow it. 
Id. at 160. 
166 Id. at 159. 
167 See id. 
168 See id. Imagine, for example, a society on the verge of a unique technological breakthrough, or of 
some preventable catastrophe. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Someone who thinks of either personal or civilizational development as linked to justice could 
endorse a saving principle oriented more toward genuine, humane, egalitarian, environmentally-friendly 
growth, perhaps to enhance the options for genuine self-realization for a greater number of persons, 
without exploiting those persons who find themselves in an early generation. The idea of saving on 
behalf of future generations can be seen as a vital opportunity, deeply fulfilling in itself, rather than as a 
burden to be borne. For some complications, however, see Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, The Social 
Discount Rate (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/caplina/sdr.pdf. 
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circumstances, the role of the largely objective basic virtues, beyond those thin 
civic virtues emphasized by Rawls,172 becomes especially important. 
The adoption and complex implementation of a just saving rate for the sake of 
future generations will often require not only the thin Rawlsian civic virtues, but 
substantial measures of what we might call Aristotelian or simply classic practical 
wisdom,173 along with the classic virtue of temperance, in the broad sense of a 
sustained disposition to exercise a reasonable degree of self-restraint, individually 
and collectively.174 
The heart of the practical problem is this: we can genuinely agree on a 
particular saving rate for the future, but then more or less innocently adopt 
systematically biased implementing policies and technical calculations175 that make 
the actual achievement of anything like the targeted saving rate highly unlikely.176 
The Rawlsian thin civic virtues, against the likely background socialization, thus 
cannot carry an agreed saving rate into actual practice with any real assurance.177 
                                                          
 
172 See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text. Of course, citizens in their private capacities may 
hold “comprehensive” views on virtues and vices ranging from various forms of nihilism and self-
indulgence, to a focus on intermediary groups, to personal altruism, to substantial collective sacrifice on 
behalf of future generations. For discussion, see RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 62, at 186–
87. 
173 See sources cited supra note 148. 
174 See generally ARISTOTLE, supra note 147; DANIEL AKST, WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY: SELF-
CONTROL IN AN AGE OF EXCESS (2011); JEAN M. TWENGE & W. KEITH CAMPBELL, THE NARCISSISM 
EPIDEMIC: LIVING IN THE AGE OF ENTITLEMENT (2009); Charles M. Young, Aristotle on Temperance, 
97 PHIL. REV. 521 (1988). The basic Rawlsian choice situation assumes heads of continuing, multi-
generational families, rather than isolated individuals, but concern for one’s own possible offspring 
hardly translates into a concern for future generational cohorts in general. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY 
OF JUSTICE §§ 33 & 44 (1972). 
175 Consider the assumptions as to likely future annual rates of return on investment made by managers 
of public retirement pension funds, or of various federal programs. But see the sources cited infra note 
177 and supra notes 126−27. 
176 In the contemporary British context, see generally ED HOWKER & SHIV MALIK, JILTED GENERATION: 
HOW BRITAIN HAS BANKRUPTED ITS YOUTH (2010). In the contemporary American context, see, 
controversially, CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT 
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2011); DAVID A. STOCKMAN, THE GREAT DEFORMATION (2013); 
NIALL FERGUSON, THE GREAT DEGENERATION (2013). Of course, each of these sources describes much 
behavior that is radically inconsistent even with the relatively “thin” Rawlsian civic virtues. 
177 For some contemporary considerations, see generally the sources cited supra notes 126−27, 175, 177. 
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We see some hints of the problem, even under clearly unjust principles and 
circumstances, in the important constitutional case of Bowsher v. Synar.178 We may 
assume that all the key Bowsher participants, including the Justices, acted in good 
faith. In the Bowsher case, Congress had, largely from a responsible concern for the 
fiscal future, adopted an unusual self-constraining statutory179 mechanism to limit 
its own politically motivated tendency to incur large future federal budgetary 
deficits and public indebtedness for the sake largely of short-term electoral 
benefits.180 
The Bowsher Court majority, however, interpreted the relevant statutory 
mechanism formalistically, viewing the fiscally self-restraining statute instead as a 
congressional attempt to improperly aggrandize its own authority by both 
legislating and then seeking also to indirectly execute its own legislation.181 
Lacking the virtue, in this case, of practical wisdom,182 the Court majority thus 
prevented Congress from attempting to limit the seriously harmful long-term 
effects of the congressional vices of private and public budgetary intemperance, 
lack of fortitude, and long-term imprudence.183 
The virtues and vices that were displayed, and then judicially undermined, in 
the Bowsher constitutional case cannot plausibly be viewed as merely constructed, 
according to some favored procedure, with moral realism and non-realism being 
largely set aside. We need not suggest that our current levels of federal public 
indebtedness184 are largely the result of the constitutional decision in Bowsher. That 
would trivialize the problem, and miss the point. Rather, the idea is that 
irresponsible public indebtedness is obviously tempting and easily rationalized in 
the moment, given the uncertainties involved. But such a policy really amounts to a 
                                                          
 
178 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
179 In particular, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985) (codified 
as amended variously in U.S.C. titles 2, 31 & 42). 
180 See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 717–18; R. George Wright, The Modern Separation of Powers: Would 
James Madison Have Untied Ulysses?, 18 CUMB. L. REV. 69 (1987). 
181 See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732, 734. 
182 But cf. id. at 759 (White, J., dissenting) (displaying a more realistic, less formalistic understanding of 
the broader case circumstances). 
183 For discussion, see generally Wright, Constitutional Cases, supra note 149, at 207–09. 
184 See, e.g., the authorities cited supra note 126. For the current federal debt level apart from the Social 
Security and Medicare, etc., programs, http://www.usdebtclock.org (providing various real time 
numbers) (last visited June 10, 2014). 
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negative saving rate, with the benefits largely accruing to current generations, and 
the costs borne largely by future generations. 
Someone might say that “indebtedness” is merely a social construct, just as 
money and credit themselves are social constructs.185 But the major consequences 
of such social constructs are nonetheless robustly real and deeply objective. The 
virtues and vices that discourage or encourage the creation of such social constructs 
are similarly morally real in their nature and status, and not merely invented, 
arbitrarily or emotionally chosen, or basically different for each culture. 
Now, it seems highly unlikely that routinely running up enormous—
realistically, not genuinely and fully repayable—public debt in the absence of any 
genuine emergency could meet Rawlsian requirements for a fair saving rate186 with 
regard to the most directly affected future generations. The point is certainly not 
that Rawlsian constitutional constructivism would on its own explicit theory 
endorse the fiscal and budgeting policies irresponsibly adopted in practice over the 
past generation or two. 
Instead, the point is that adopting and implementing a just saving rate 
inevitably involves many systematic unconscious biases and exploitable 
uncertainties that must be responded to, at the constitutional and other levels, with 
or without practical wisdom and other genuine, unconstructed virtues.187 These are 
genuine, objective virtues upon which Rawls cannot meaningfully rely without 
abandoning his constitutional constructivism.188 But if such virtues were properly 
manifested, they might discipline our conscious or sub-conscious temptations, at all 
levels, to self-indulgence in implementing a just saving rate. And, even more 
importantly, a parallel story could be told about nearly every other constitutionally 
relevant feature of Rawlsian justice, including inequalities of opportunity, or 
                                                          
 
185 See SEARLE, supra note 1. 
186 See supra notes 163−71 and accompanying text. 
187 We need take no position on how practical wisdom may be related to any of the other genuine, 
deeply objective, basically unconstructed virtues. 
188 Rawls does presume what he refers to as the “moral power” to devise, apply, and comply with the 
basic principles of justice. See, e.g., RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 103, 315−16. But 
Rawls clearly does not intend to thereby casually wave away problems of implementation and stability. 
See id. at 140–44. 
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inequalities of access to the Rawlsian basic goods.189 Real and stable just results 
require real, non-constructed basic virtues. 
In the end, Rawls’ account of the stability of a just society unfortunately relies 
largely on his thin civic virtues, and on the assumed socializing effects of growing 
up and living one’s life under a regime of just rules, principles, and institutions.190 
It is certainly fair to imagine that living much of one’s life under a regime that 
meets Rawls’ criteria for justice would indeed tend to “normalize” and win 
allegiance toward191 such a regime. But Rawls offers us no reason why familiar 
subconscious biases, cognitive and emotional,192 in favor of those we most closely 
identify with would not be systematically manifested even in good faith attempts to 
stably implement Rawlsian justice. The basic virtues, morally real at their 
fundamental level, would have to play some stabilizing role. 
What we might call the Rawlsian “transitional problem” is this: there will 
inevitably be a distinct need for the morally real virtue of practical wisdom, along 
with allied real virtues, during the extended process of historically transitioning 
from an unjust to a stable just society in the first place. And there are crucial limits 
to any society’s ability, in such a context, to culturally redefine or revalue what 
counts as practical wisdom, or its lack. During any such transition from an unjust to 
a just society, and to the latter’s stability, the existing socialization processes and 
allegiances may hinder as much as help. Especially throughout this transitional 
period, as policy implementation options and uncertainties are initially confronted 
at every level, reliance on the classic, fundamentally non-constructed virtues will 
be indispensable for Rawlsian constitutional regime stability.193 
                                                          
 
189 See, e.g., RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 62, at §§ 13, 17, 19. For critique of these 
elements of Rawlsian justice, beyond their constructivist features, see, for example, G.A. COHEN, 
RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY (2009); BRIAN FELTHAM JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND CONSTRUCTIVISM 
(2009); see also R. George Wright, The High Cost of Rawls’s Inegalitarianism, 30 WESTERN POL. Q. 73 
(1977). For a broader response, with some attention to Rawls’ downplaying of metaphysics, see Jean 
Hampton, Should Political Philosophy be Done Without Metaphysics?, 99 ETHICS 791 (1989). 
190 See, e.g., RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 142. 
191 See id. 
192 See, for example, the deeply humane and practically wise DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND 
SLOW (2013); GERD GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (2008); 
THOMAS GILOVICH, DALE GRIFFIN & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (2002). 
193 For a broad, treasury-like background, see CHRISTOPHER PETERSON & MARTIN SELIGMAN, 
CHARACTER STRENGTHS AND VIRTUES: A HANDBOOK AND CLASSIFICATION (2004); and see the leading 
ethical classicist T.H. IRWIN, ARISTOTLE’S FIRST PRINCIPLES 460 (1988) (“Aristotle recommends the 
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V. CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AS 
REALISTICALLY UNSUSTAINABLE 
In light of the dominance, complexity, and sophistication of John Rawls’ 
path-breaking work over a period of decades, a negative verdict on his leading 
version constitutional constructivism should not be lightly reached. Still, Rawlsian 
constitutional constructivism should not be immune from the kinds of critique 
Rawls’ overall theory continues to undergo. 
We have particularly emphasized the important but unacknowledged role of 
deeply real, and not merely thin or constructed, virtues in implementing, nurturing, 
and stabilizing a just Rawlsian regime over time. The problem for constitutional 
constructivism would persist even if no one held an extremist, intolerant, or 
illiberal comprehensive view of politics, morality, or religion. 
The importance of the genuine, basically unconstructed classic virtues in 
sustaining a Rawlsian just society begins with common sense observations. 
Consider, for example, the observations of a well-respected virtue-oriented theorist, 
Professor Michael Slote, who analogizes “the laws, customs, and institutions of a 
given society”194 to the less enduring actions of a particular person, where both 
sorts of actions reflect motivations195 with one combination or another of virtues 
and vices.196 Laws and institutions, including those of Rawlsian constructivism, 
reflect not merely thin civic virtues and knowledge, or the lack thereof, but basic 
and real virtues, or, unfortunately, the lack thereof.197 
Professor Slote then argues that “[w]here the writing and implementation of a 
constitution . . . is motivated by greed or indifference to others, the constitution is 
not a just one.”198 Thus for Professor Slote, “the justice of a given society cannot 
                                                                                                                                      
 
virtues as sources of stability and of other benefits for a state”) (emphasis added). For a mere 
introduction to some relations among virtues, institutional instability, and crucial unrecognized 
collective action problems, see Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF ECONOMICS (June 26, 2014), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc. 
194 MICHAEL SLOTE, MORALS FROM MOTIVES 99 (2001). 
195 See id. 
196 See id. at 99−100. 
197 See id. at 99–101; see also WERNER JAEGER, PAIDEA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE: IN SEARCH 
OF THE DIVINE CENTRE 323 (Gilbert Highet trans., 1986) (1943) (“We speak of the ‘spirit of the 
constitution’ . . . but the spirit has been created and given its special character by the type of [persons] 
who have made the state that suits them.”). 
198 SLOTE, supra note 194, at 101. 
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simply be ‘read off’ from the way institutions (or laws) are at a given time. . . .”199 
A deeper examination is required. 
Rawls’ constitutional constructivism, as we have seen,200 clearly does not 
entirely ignore the role of certain limited virtues, whether this is in the end really 
consistent with a thorough constructivism201 or not. And we do not claim that any 
set of genuine, basically unconstructed virtues is somehow more important for 
constitutional and other dimensions of justice than are principles of justice, or the 
assumptions underlying those principles.202 
Instead, the argument herein has held that a thorough constitutional 
constructivism, after the fashion of Rawls’ or any related version inevitably 
undervalues the role of genuine, morally real, unconstructed basic virtues in 
promoting and realistically sustaining the establishment of a just constitution and a 
just society. 
                                                          
 
199 Id. at 109. 
200 See, e.g., supra notes 128−29 and accompanying text. 
201 We have largely taken Rawls’ constitutional constructivism on its own terms and have asked whether 
that constructivism is actually parasitic, in practice, on real or basically non-constructed classic virtues, 
even if all citizens are reasonable Rawlsian liberals. We have largely set aside the further question of 
whether the civic virtues and the moral socialization on which Rawls explicitly relies are actually best 
understood in morally realist terms. But see supra notes 144–48, 161 and accompanying text. For 
background, see, for example, RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at Lecture III: Political 
Constructivism. Of course, if Rawls’ own theory implicitly embodies substantial elements of moral 
realism or deep moral objectivity, constitutional constructivism is in even more serious trouble as a 
coherent approach. 
202 Many mainstream writers on constitutional, political, and moral theory obviously choose not to make 
virtues and vices central to their approach; it would thus hardly be helpful merely to accuse Rawls of 
unduly emphasizing rules or principles rather than virtues in general. For an interesting general 
comparison of broad moral approaches, see generally MARCIA W. BARON, PHILIP PETIT & MICHAEL 
SLOTE, THREE METHODS OF ETHICS: A DEBATE (1997). 
